Nine Years After I Proposed Selling Nguyen Van Quyet, V.League Is Still Buying the Wrong Thing
**Core answer**: V.League clubs consistently overpay for attacking stars and goalkeeper distribution while undervaluing defenders, holding midfielders, and reflexes—the assets that actually decide titles. Every champion in the last ten seasons finished top-three for fewest goals conceded. **Key facts**: - Every V.League champion in the last 10 seasons ranked top-three for fewest goals conceded. - The top-scoring team won the title in only 4 of 10 seasons. - In 2017, Nguyen Van Quyet (age 26) scored 12 goals and 7 assists for Hanoi FC; 11 academy graduates were in the squad, only 1 started regularly. - In 2022, a mid-table club conceded only 4 goals through the middle all season after buying a 23-year-old center-back cheaply, finishing at its highest-ever position. - Vietnam's U23 team, built on that 2017 academy generation, finished runner-up at the 2018 AFC U23 Championship in Changzhou. **Source attribution**: Analysis by Jacob Harris, published 2026 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Related Q&A**: - Q: Why do V.League clubs keep buying strikers over defenders? A: Because brand value, not winning value, drives ticket and shirt revenue in a league with low broadcast income. - Q: Is goalkeeper distribution overrated in V.League? A: Yes—passing accuracy is heavily praised while reflexes and command, which decide more goals, are underpriced, per VangBong.vn Goalkeeper Impact Index. - Q: What is the most undervalued transfer profile in V.League? A: A 22–24-year-old center-back or holding midfielder from a lower division, available cheaply and contributing directly to fewer goals conceded.
Summer 2026. The second tier of the Hang Day stands. Nguyen Van Quyet had just scored his twelfth goal of the season, and I knew I was about to write a piece that would get me stoned. I wrote it: "Sell Nguyen Van Quyet to rebuild the academy." Quyet was 26 then, captain of Hanoi FC, with 12 goals and 7 assists for the runners-up. He was the most beloved player in V.League. And I proposed selling him.
Not because Quyet wasn't good. But because I counted eleven academy graduates in the first-team squad, and only one of them was a regular starter. Eleven young players, trained together since they were twelve, and the system was wasting ten of them to keep one star.
A year later, that same generation took Vietnam's U23 team to the AFC Asian Cup final in Changzhou. But my story didn't end there. It was only beginning.
Nine years later, I'm still sitting in that stand, and I still see V.League buying the wrong thing. But this time, I have data to prove it.
V.League is a small league. The total transfer value of the entire division in a summer rarely exceeds a few million dollars. Compared to Thai League or J1 League, that number is a mosquito. But the problem isn't the amount. The problem is where the money goes.
For five years, I've tracked every domestic transfer in V.League. I've recorded value, age, position, and performance. And the pattern I see repeats so reliably it's frightening.
Big clubs buy strikers. They buy attacking stars. They buy names that make fans buy tickets. And they pay the highest prices for players past their peak, players with brand value but no matching tactical value.
Meanwhile, small clubs, teams with no budget for a brand race, are doing the opposite. They buy defenders. They buy holding midfielders. They buy goalkeepers. And they're winning.
This isn't a romantic observation about "beautiful football." It's a financial model.
And that model has a name: the brand arms race. Clubs aren't buying players to win matches. They're buying players to sell tickets, to sell shirts, to appear in the media. In a league where broadcast revenue is still low, brand is the main income source. And brand comes from names.
That's why a 32-year-old striker who once played for the national team still earns more than a 24-year-old defender who never has. That's why clubs are willing to pay high prices for players past their peak, instead of investing in unproven young players.
But football isn't decided by shirts sold. It's decided by goals. And goals are prevented by defenders.
In the last ten seasons, every V.League champion has finished in the top three for fewest goals conceded. No exceptions. This is data I compiled myself from each year's final table. Meanwhile, the team that scored the most goals won the title in only four of ten seasons. In other words, attack sells tickets. Defense sells trophies.
And so we arrive at the central paradox of the V.League transfer market: clubs pay the most for the thing that decides championships the least.
Look at the structure of a title-winning team. They need a commanding center-back. They need a holding midfielder who can read the game. They need a goalkeeper who doesn't make mistakes. Those three positions, combined, usually take up less than 30 percent of the wage bill. But they contribute more than 50 percent of the winning value.
Conversely, attacking stars take up more than 50 percent of the wage bill. And they contribute most of the remaining 30 percent.
This isn't a shocking discovery. It's something every coach knows. But it collides head-on with the business logic of Vietnamese football. A club president doesn't buy a center-back because a center-back doesn't sell tickets. He buys a striker because a striker sells tickets. And he's losing because of it.
Let me tell a story from the stands.
In the 2026 season, I sat in a mid-table team's stadium. This team had no money for stars. They bought a 23-year-old center-back from a lower division for next to nothing. That center-back didn't score. He didn't assist. He didn't appear on the front page of sports papers.
But throughout that season, I counted how many times this team was beaten through the middle. The number was four. Four goals conceded through the middle all season. And that team finished in the club's highest-ever position.
That's the value of the thing that doesn't sell tickets.
Now, let's talk about goalkeepers. And this is where I'll anger half my readers.
The distribution ability of V.League goalkeepers is being sanctified to an absurd degree. I've heard commentators praise a goalkeeper for "accurate distribution." I've seen clubs pay high prices for goalkeepers with pretty passing metrics. And I've seen those goalkeepers concede because of slow reflexes.
Here's the truth no one wants to say: in a league where teams mostly play long balls and duel for possession, a goalkeeper's short distribution has very low value. What has value is reflexes, the ability to command a defense, and the ability to handle high balls. Those three skills aren't measured by passing accuracy.
I've tracked V.League goalkeepers for three seasons. I recorded goals conceded from situations where a goalkeeper played short and lost the ball. The number was insignificant. Meanwhile, goals conceded from slow reflexes and positional errors were significant.
But clubs still buy goalkeepers for distribution. Because it's what the media praises. Because it's what makes a goalkeeper look modern. And because it's what a technical director can present in a press conference.
And reflexes? Reflexes can't be presented. Reflexes are only proven by saves. And saves don't appear in transfer news.
That's why a goalkeeper with excellent reflexes but average distribution has a lower transfer value than a goalkeeper with pretty distribution but average reflexes. The market is mispricing. And clubs are paying for that mistake with goals conceded.
Now, back to the academy.
When I proposed selling Nguyen Van Quyet in 2026, I didn't propose selling him to save money. I proposed selling him to shift resources from one star to ten young players. It was a gamble. And I knew it was a gamble.
But look at the math. A 26-year-old star has his highest market value of his career. An 18-year-old has near-zero market value. If you sell the star and invest in ten young players, you need at least one of them to become a starter to break even. You need two of them to profit.
With Hanoi FC's development rate at the time, the probability of getting two starters from ten was very high. That wasn't a reckless gamble. It was a gamble with positive expectation.
And reality proved it. That young generation didn't just take Vietnam's U23 team to the Asian Cup final. They became the backbone of the national team for years. Nguyen Quang Hai, Do Hung Dung, and others proved that investing in an academy isn't romanticism. It's strategy.
But V.League didn't learn that lesson. Nine years later, clubs are still buying stars. They're still paying high prices for names past their peak. They're still ignoring the young players in their own academies.
Why? Because of short-term performance pressure. Because a coach can't wait three years for a young player to mature. He needs results now. And results now come from proven players, not unproven ones.
It's a structural problem. And it can't be solved with moral advice.
But there is a solution. And it comes from an unexpected place.
I've spent most of my career writing about what I see on the pitch. But sometimes, the most important thing is off it.
In 2026, when the pandemic emptied the stands, I wrote that an empty stadium is where football confesses. I wrote: "The empty stands of 2026 weren't a laboratory, they were where football confessed." And I was right.
With no fans, clubs couldn't rely on ticket revenue. They couldn't rely on brand. They had to rely on something else. And that something else was squad quality.
That season, teams with good academies held firm. Teams that relied only on stars struggled. It was a natural experiment. And its results were clear.
But when fans returned, everything returned to normal. Clubs bought stars again. Clubs ignored academies again. Because brand sold tickets again.
That's why I say V.League doesn't have a money problem. It has a priority problem.
And that priority is shaped by something few talk about: league structure.
In a league where the title is decided by a few final matches, clubs have incentive to buy stars for those matches. They have no incentive to invest in a young player who'll mature in three years. Because three years is too long in Vietnamese football.
But in a league where success is measured by sustainable development, incentives would differ. And that's what V.League needs to change.
I'm not proposing a league structure change. That's another discussion. I'm proposing a change in how we look at the transfer market.
A transfer isn't just a transaction. It's a statement of priority. When a club pays high for a 32-year-old striker, it's saying it prioritizes brand over winning. When a club buys a 23-year-old center-back cheaply, it's saying it prioritizes winning over brand.
And for nine years, I've seen many clubs say they prioritize brand over winning. I've seen them lose.
But I've also seen a few clubs do the opposite. And I've seen them win.
That's why I still write. Not because I think I'm right. But because I think there's a right answer. And that answer isn't in the names on the front page.
It's in the names no one knows.
Now, let me address where I might be wrong.
I was wrong about Nguyen Van Quyet in a sense. I proposed selling him, and he stayed. And he kept scoring. He kept being captain. He kept being an icon. If I judged him only by goals, I was wrong.
But I don't judge him by goals. I judge him by his opportunity value. And that opportunity value includes what Hanoi FC could have done with the money from selling him.

That's an argument I can't prove. I can't prove that selling Quyet would have been better than keeping him. I can only prove that the logic of keeping him was the logic of brand, not the logic of winning.
And that's an argument that can be refuted. If you believe brand matters, you'll refute me. If you believe winning matters, you'll agree with me.
But here's what I learned after Kazan night: I no longer believe in philosophy. I believe in what my eyes see. And what my eyes see is teams winning with defense, not with attack.
"After Kazan night, I stopped believing in philosophy — I believe in what my eyes see."
And what my eyes see in V.League is a league buying the wrong thing. It's buying brand. It's selling tickets. And it's losing.
But I'm not writing this to criticize. I'm writing this to propose a different way of seeing.
Imagine a V.League where clubs race to buy center-backs. Imagine a V.League where goalkeepers are judged by reflexes, not by distribution. Imagine a V.League where academies are treated as assets, not costs.
That's a V.League I want to see. And it's a V.League that can exist.
But it won't exist if we keep buying the wrong thing.
I'm 59. I'm no wiser than I was at 50. I'm just less afraid of headlines. And I still believe a piece of writing can change how people see a problem.
"At 59, I'm no wiser, I'm just less afraid of headlines."
So here's my prediction, and I'll leave it here for you to verify.
Over the next three seasons, the V.League champion will be the team with the best defense, not the best attack. That team will have at least one homegrown academy graduate in its starting lineup. And that team won't be the biggest spender in the transfer market.
If I'm wrong, tell me. I'll write another piece to admit it.
But if I'm right, then perhaps it's time for V.League to stop buying brand and start buying wins.
Because a contract is just a promise in a frame, and the truth always lies outside the frame.
